





The following discussion records the 1982 quasi-constitutional
developments in the embattled counties of British-ruled Northern
Ireland. These developments transpired in the context of a domes-
tic war, a war which has long and bitterly divided the citizenry.
Even while the war raged, communal divisions were again reflected
in the polarized results of the October 20, 1982, elections to the new
Northern Ireland Assembly. It will be shown that the British pro-
posals for the Northern Ireland Assembly failed to elicit support
from the Northern Ireland minority element. They did, however,
elicit hostility from the government of the Republic of Ireland.
The widely assailed Northern Ireland Assembly will briefly be
examined. It will be argued that the government of the United
Kingdom, assuming arguendo that London is to remain in North-
ern Ireland, would have done well to devise an Assembly premised
upon the concurrent majority theory of popular government. The
concurrent majority principle, as extensive passages from its pri-
mary theorist-advocate demonstrate, is premised upon deriving
government from a polity's overall population. This principle con-
trasts with constitutional theories which derive government from
one faction or another in a highly polarized community.
A politico-legal theory proposing interfactional reconciliation
in a battle-torn political arena like Northern Ireland requires close
scrutiny and considerable skepticism. It will be seen that an eco-
nomic analysis of voting behavior does identify a drawback to con-
current majority power sharing. A test of that drawback against
real-world experiments-including one in Northern Ireland and
the concurrent majority practice in the United Nations Security
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Council-will, however, reveal the possible merit of gambling on a
concurrent majority principle within a Northern Ireland Assembly.
I. THE WAR IN NORTHERN IRELAND
The July 20, 1982, armed strike in London, England, by the
Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.) resulted in
the wounding of approximately thirty British troops' and the death
of eleven British soldiers. 2 Not since a November 1974 Irish Re-
publican Army attack in the Midlands city of Birmingham had the
British mainland sustained such a devastating blow.3 During the
very week of the London strike, a British bill restoring limited local
governmental powers to Northern Ireland was being read in the
House of Lords.4 Notwithstanding the carnage in London, the
British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, James Prior, proved
adamant in scheduling October 20, 1982, elections for the prospec-
tive Northern Ireland Assembly. 5
As Secretary of State Prior held firm to his schedule, the
Northern Ireland war continued. On September 1, 1982, the Irish
National Liberation Army (not to be confused with either wing of
the Irish Republican Army) attempted to assassinate Belfast City
Councilor Billy Dickson, a party colleague of prominent Northern
Ireland Protestant politician Reverand Ian Paisley, because Dick-
son "belonged to a Fascist organization." 6 That same day Rever-
and Paisley launched his party's campaign for the Northern Ireland
Assembly election.7
In Belfast a bomb killed a British soldier on September 27,
1982, on the West Circular Road between the Protestant and Ro-
man Catholic areas of the city.8 Two British troops were
wounded.9
On election eve a firebomb exploded outside the Belfast head-
1. Carnage in thepark, THE ECONOMIST, July 24, 1982, at 49.
2. Maitland, IRA attacks put snag in home-rule talks, Toronto Star, Aug. 9, 1982, at
A13, col. 1.
3. Id.
4. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 1, at 50. It has been speculated, however, that the
London strike had more to do with the I.R.A.'s reaction to the 1982 Anglo-Argentinian Falk-
land Islands War than to the British devolution plans. Maitland, supra note 2, at A 13, col. 1.
5. Maitland, supra note 2, at A13, col. 4.
6. Ulster Protestant leader shot by Irish nationalists, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 3,
1982, at 2, col. 5.
7. Id.
8. Booby trap kills British soldier, News-Journal Papers, Sept. 27, 1982, at A2, col. i.
9. Id.
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quarters of Northern Ireland's Official Unionist Party, the main
Protestant political party.10 The firebomb had been planted by the
Irish National Liberation Army (I.N.L.A.). That same group also
planted a gasoline bomb, found on election day, next to the house
of Official Unionist Party leader James Molyneaux. I
On October 22, 1982, Joseph Donegan, a forty-eight-year-old,
Roman Catholic father of seven, was dragged by Protestant extre-
mists into a car in Belfast. 2 Three days later he was found blud-
geoned to death.'
3
On October 27, 1982, several men burst into the apartment of
Roman Catholic William Kelly, tied him to a chair, and slowly
sawed off Kelly's right hand. 4 On the same day, the I.R.A.
claimed responsibility for a fatal explosion-the ambush of two
constables and a sergeant of the (mostly Protestant) Royal Ulster
Constabulary. 5 Police estimated that the blast, heard five miles
away, was produced by a half-ton of explosives.
16
On October 29, 1982, the body of militia sergeant Thomas
Cochrane was found in a field near the Irish Republic border.
1 7
The Provisional Wing of the I.R.A. announced that it had "exe-
cuted" the sergeant for "serious crimes against the nationalist
population."'"
Within a week after election day, six persons had died, includ-
ing two Catholics. One of the Catholics was a member of the Pro-
visional Sinn Fein, the political side of the Provisional Wing of the
I.R.A.' 9 These Catholics were killed by loyalist extremists.2 °
Suspected I.R.A. guerillas later ambushed an armored police
10. Firebomb punctuates Northern Ireland vote, News-Journal Papers, Oct. 19, 1982, at
A2, col. 1.
11. Blanche, 25,000 guarding polls as Irish cast ballots, News-Journal Papers, Oct. 20,
1982, at A2, col. 3.
12. Blanche, Total disaster seen facing N. Ireland, News-Journal Papers, Nov. 1, 1982, at
A2, col. 2.
13. Id.
14. Bomb ambush kills three Irishpolice, News-Journal Papers, Oct. 28, 1982, at A2, col.
2.
15. Id. at A2, col. 3.
16. Id.
17. Blanche, supra note 12, at A2, col. 3.
18. Id.
19. McCreary, Post-election violence in Northern Ireland deals setback to Prior plans for
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vehicle with rocket and machine gun fire.2 ' The guerillas also
sprayed a police station in the heart of West Belfast with bullets.22
On November 30, 1982, a parcel exploded inside the 10 Down-
ing Street residence of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.23
A caller to Belfast's downtown radio station claimed responsibility
on behalf of the I.N.L.A.24
Three days later, as schoolbus driver Protestant James Gibbon
was dropping off Roman Catholic school children in County
Tyrone, he was killed at point blank range, causing his bus to ca-
reen into a hedge.25  The Provisional I.R.A. claimed
responsibility.26
On December 6, 1982, the I.N.L.A. struck a favorite gathering
place of Britain's First Cheshire Regiment based at Shackleton
Barracks, one of Britain's main military bases in northwest North-
ern Ireland. 27  The I.N.L.A. bombing killed at least ten British
troops and resulted in at least sixteen fatalities in the town of Bal-
lykelly, fifty miles northwest of Belfast. Subsequently, Dr. Harry
Bennett, a surgeon at Londonderry's Altnagelvin Hospital, said,
"Not since the . . . massacre near Belfast when fourteen people
were killed in 1978 has there been anything like it for unimaginable
horror."
28
The October 20, 1982, Northern Ireland Assembly elections
thus failed to assuage the embattled people of Northern Ireland.
Indeed, more than 25,000 police and British troops guarded politi-
cians and polling places on election day.29 The Irish Times of Dub-
lin editoralized: "The slaughter . . . in Northern Ireland may be
the first stages of a new and even grimmer progression. It will not
easily be halted by words."30
21. IRA terrorists launch attacks on Belfast police, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 1, 1982,
at 2, col. 2.
22. Id.
23. Thatcher office bombed, News-Journal Papers, Nov. 30, 1982, at I, col. i.
24. Id.
25. Ulster school bus driver slain, Chicago Sun-Times, Dec. 3, 1982, at 24, col. 2.
26. Id.
27. N. Ireland blast kills 16, News-Journal Papers, Dec. 7, 1982, at A2, col. 4; A6, col. 3-
4.
28. Id. It was reported the next week that the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Protes-
tant-dominated police force, killed two suspected leaders of the I.N.L.A. in the city of Ar-
magh. News-Journal Papers, Dec. 13, 1982, at A2, col. I.
29. Blanche, supra note I1, at A2, col. 3.
30. Blanche, supra note 12, at A2, col. 2.
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II. ELECTORAL POLARIZATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND
Irish Protestant and Roman Catholic hostility to the prospec-
tive Northern Ireland Assembly was widespread. Mr. Molyneaux
of the Official Unionist Party had characterized the Assembly idea
as "unworkable."'" The Unionists had asked Britain to scrap its
plan for Assembly power sharing when the (largely Roman Catho-
lic) Social Democratic and Labour Party (S.D.L.P.) announced that
it would participate in the election but would boycott the
Assembly.32
The Social Democratic and Labour Party . . .voted 25 to
14 to participate in a special Oct. 20 election for the new assem-
bly, but not to take their seats in the proposed 78-seat body to be
set up by the British government.
The vote might appear to be an Irish approach to a typically
Irish problem, but it has its own cold logic. The [S.D.L.P.] ar-
gued that the assembly offered nothing substantial to the Catho-
lic community. There was no 'Irish dimension' that satisfied
Catholic aspiration for a united Ireland. There was also no firm
commitment that they would be allowed to share power in the
north with the province's Protestant politicians.
The British government privately hoped that power-sharing
would evolve, but there were no signs that the Protestants' repre-
sentatives would allow this to happen. Ironically, the [S.D.L.P.]
achieved power-sharing, and an Irish dimension, in British pro-
posals hammered out eight years ago. But these plans were
abandoned in the face of massive Protestant opposition.
This time the Catholics were offered much less, so it is no
surprise that they have refused to participate.33
Only the small, nonsectarian Alliance Party was willing to try
power sharing.
34
As indicated above, an "Irish dimension," that is, a Northern
Ireland-Republic of Ireland relationship, had obtained in the 1974
British-sponsored Northern Ireland power-sharing plan. The ab-
sence of this dimension from the 1982 British proposals caused the
Assembly project to be repudiated not only by the Protestants and
Roman Catholics of Northern Ireland, but also by the government
31. Blanche, supra note 11, at A2, col. 5.
32. McCreary, Prospect of N. Ireland unity dims as Catholic party boycotts assembly,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 8, 1982, at 7, col. 1.
33. Id.
34. McCreary, N. Ireland under Prior lurches forward with uncertainty, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Sept. 17, 1982, at 13, col. 1.
Vol. 13
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of the Republic of Ireland. In 1982 the Irish Republic's Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Gerard Collins, explained to the Irish
Parliament:
The [Irish] government has already made clear our fear at
the consequences which may follow from yet another failed Brit-
ish government initiative. With the announcement of voting in
the autumn for the proposed Northern Ireland Assembly, our
apprehension grows greater.
This institution is to be in and for Northern Ireland alone,
and its intended role is to restore a devolved executive in and for
Northern Ireland alone. Few deputies I believe will not see such
a concept as retrograde and insufficient, and few in this House
will likewise fail to deplore the retreat by the present British gov-
ernment from the commitment to prescribed power-sharing in
Northern Ireland. This commitment has been a constant in pol-
icy of various British governments since 1973.
Instead, the evolution of affairs within the new assembly is
to be left to the free play of the political parties. Everybody
knows which political tradition will dominate in such a situation,
and we hear already that dominant Unionist interest declare its
attitude-an attitude which has not varied over 60 years and
which, not surprisingly, is marked by contemptuous rejection of
the present British plan.35
Secretary Prior rejected suggestions from the Republic that the As-
sembly should be discussed between the United Kingdom and the
Republic before plans were launched.3 6 By the end of July 1982,
Reuters reported that a "diplomatic dispute"
3 7 was '.rumbling" 38
between London and Dublin.
Vice-President Garry Adams of Sinn Fein was the first elected
member of the Northern Ireland Assembly.39 The 1982 balloting
marked the first time that Sinn Fein, Gaelic for "Ourselves Alone,"
had contested an election under its own banner since the December
1969 formation of the Provisional I.R.A. and their campaign to
unite Ireland.4 ° Sinn Fein had fielded only twelve of the 184 candi-
35. Collins, Dublin and Northern Ireland's election, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 21,
1982, at 23, col. 1.
36. Lost her Irish dimension?, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 1982, at 17, 18.
37. Tories want to end Irish voting rights in U.K., Toronto Star, July 31, 1982, at All,
col. 1, 3.
38. Id. at All, col. 3,
39. Blanche, Leaders of IR4 rack up wins as N. Ireland votes, News-Journal Papers, Oct.
21, 1982, at A2, col. 1.
40. Blanche, Irish assembly victors includefew moderates, News-Journal Papers, Oct. 22,
1982, at A2, col. 4.
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dates for the seventy-eight-member Assembly,4' but elected five.4 2
Sinn Fein had proposed to assume power "with a ballot paper
in one hand and an Armalite [rifle] in the other. ' 43 Upon his vic-
tory Vice President Adams declared: "Obviously the [I.R.A.] has
support. The [I.R.A.] has been involved in a struggle against one of
the biggest armies in the world for years."'
The Economist of London found that the 64,000 Northern Ire-
land Assembly votes for Provisional Sinn Fein were derived gener-
ally from Catholics45  who never before46  had voted.47  The
Economist discerned:
Almost the entire Catholic voting population of Northern
Ireland-37% of the electorate-supported candidates commit-
ted to playing no part in the new assembly. That Catholic com-
munity was split as never before between its constitutional and
its revolutionary wings, and the constitutional side-represented
by the Social Democratic and Labour Party. . .- was seen to be
losing its force to the revolutionary nationalists of the Provi-
sional Irish Republican Army.
Sinn Fein got 10% of the first-preference votes cast under
the province's system of proportional representation. Mr. Prior,
and other reasoned constitutional voices such as The Times [sic)
in London and the Irish Times [sic] have tried to down-play the
significance of this 10%. But it is clear fact that the Provisionals
41. Id.
42. Blanche, supra note 12, at A2, col. 4.
43. Id.
44. Blanche, supra note 39, at A2, col. 2. The pairing of ballots and Armalites was
made by successful Northern Ireland Assembly candidate Danny Morrison. McCreary,
supra note 19, at 4, col. 2. Said Adams, who polled 9,740 votes: "While the British remain in
Ireland, the IRA will remain in there fighting." IRA "spolitical wing wins seat in Ulster assem-
bly, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 22, 1982, at 2, col. 1.
45. Sinn Fein's candidates and canvassers are very young, and they are perceived
correctly by everyone else here as a potent new force in Northern Irish politics, the
new generation of Irish nationalists who, after ten years of watching their elders
gain very little through the nonviolent efforts of the S.D.L.P., have chosen the men
who fight with the ballot and the gun.
Breasted, War Without End, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 29, 1982, at 16, 17.
46. In the United States, the majority coalitions of Andrew Jackson and Franklin
Roosevelt were not derived from the conversion of opposition voters, but from the courting
of previous nonvoters. A. HADLEY, THE EMPTY POLLING BOOTH 17, 57-59 (1978).
Professor James MacGregor Burns, citing Huey Long and the German Nazis, has
warned of the potential threat to political stability caused by a sudden coalition of now-
radicalized previous nonvoters. J. BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY: FOUR PARTY
POLITICS IN AMERICA 228-29 (1964)(with revisions). On the other hand, Dr. Seymour Mar-
tin Lipset suggests that Burns' German example is inapposite. S. LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN:
THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 148-53 (1963).
47. Ulster's voting is over, its killing continues, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 1982, at 51.
Vol. 13
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have emerged from the election with, for the first time, a solid
political base.48
Meanwhile, it was reported that "Protestants elected 47 mem-
bers who are pledged never to share power with Catholics and
whose aim is to force London to hand back control of the province
to the Protestant majority. '4 9 Elected in addition to these forty-
seven members (twenty-one Democratic Unionists and twenty-six
Official Unionists) were two other Unionists, ten Alliance Party
members, fourteen S.D.L.P. members and five Sinn Fein
members.5 0
III. THE NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY PLAN
An April 1982 White Paper, "Northern Ireland: A Framework
for Devolution," was presented to the British Parliament by the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, James Prior.5' It called for
a seventy-eight-member unicameral Assembly elected by the single
transferable vote method of proportional representation, with each
U.K. Parliamentary constituency returning a prescribed number of
representatives to the Assembly.5 2 Given the tragic history of Brit-
ish rule over Northern Ireland,53 the Prior White Paper prudently
ruled out the prospect of numerical majority rule:
The object of the Government's proposals is to point to a
way whereby, in spite of their acknowledged and continuing dif-
ferences, the two sides of the community may achieve sufficient
mutual respect, and make sufficient mutual accommodations, to
participate more creatively in the public life of the Province. To-
tal repudiation of violence, with all that implies for economic
advance and the prevention of further suffering for families in
48. Id.
49. Blanche, supra note 12, at A2, cols. 4-5. "[Bloth groups of Unionists still refuse to
share power with Catholics." McCreary, N. Ireland elections leave pro vince far from home
rule, Oct. 25, 1982, at 3, col. 2.
50. THE EcoNoMiST, supra note 47, at 52.
51. Northern Ireland: A Framework for Devolution, Cmnd. No. 8541 (Apr. 1982)
(available from Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, England).
52. Id. para. 31, at 8.
53. The division of Ireland and its resultant centuries of misery dates back to the
'Plantation of Ulster' in the reign of James I, when the City of London, founding
the new city of London, Derry, together with a flood of immigrants from Scotland
and other parts of the United Kingdom, created a major and robust Protestant pres-
ence in St. Patrick's Catholic island. The religious split and Ireland's other
problems dominated politics on both sides of the water, caused the resignation of
Pitt the Younger in 1801-he was to return briefly to office in 1804 until his death
in 1806-and can be said to have ended the ministerial careers of Peel, Gladstone
and Lloyd George.
H. WILSON, FINAL TERM: THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT 1974-1976, at 66 (1979).
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Northern Ireland, is only likely to come about when both sides
of the community recognize each other's different aspirations
and when they are able to live together as good neighbours.
Given the importance of these two identities and traditions
in Northern Ireland, the application of simple majority rule
would (as in the past) leave the minority in perpetual and inef-
fectual opposition where they can become prey to those who seek
change by violent means. This cannot lead to the stable society
in the establishment of which the majority have as much interest
as the minority.54
Precluding a simple majority rule ab initio, what Assembly-voting
alternative remains?
The Prior reply, geared toward attaining a Northern Ireland
consensus, appeared keyed to a seventy-percent rule:
[I]t is for the Assembly to determine how, within the new ar-
rangements, executive and legislative powers should be exer-
cised. The crucial requirement is that the Assembly's proposals
should be likely to command widespread acceptance throughout
the community: in forming a judgment on this the Government
would only consider a proposal to command sufficiently wide-
spread acceptance if it appeared to be acceptable to both sides of
the community. If it met this criterion the Government would
ask Parliament to approve whatever arrangements were pro-
posed and to transfer powers so that devolved government could
be restored. It would be for the parties and the Assembly to de-
cide how detailed the agreed arrangements should be. For ex-
ample, they might wish to include arrangements whereby
differences between the parties to the agreement when devolved
government was under way could be resolved without jeopardiz-
ing the broad support for the devolved administration.
The process leading up to transfer of power would be as
follows:
(a) If not less than 70% of Assembly members agreed on a Re-
port on the way in which powers should be discharged and an
administration formed, that Report would be submitted to the
Secretary of State who would be required to lay it before Parlia-
ment. The Government would arrange for the proposals to be
debated and during the debate the Government would express a
view on whether the Report appeared to be acceptable to both
sides of the community in Northern Ireland. Depending on Par-
liamentary reaction to the Report, the Secretary of State could
54. Northern Ireland: A Framework for Devolution, supra note 51, paras. 18-19, at 5.
Vol. 13
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lay a draft Order in Council for Parliament's approval transfer-
ring executive and legislative powers.
(b) If a Report on the exercise of devolved powers were agreed
by a majority of less than 70% of the members of the Assembly,
the Secretary of State could, if it appeared to him that its propos-
als were acceptable to both sides of the community, invite the
Assembly to submit that Report to him and the procedure at (a)
above would then apply.
55
It would of course be for the Assembly to decide how its
voting procedure should be conducted on proposed legislation or
on other issues within its competence. It might decide that on
some key issues of confidence it would be right to require a ma-
jority of, for example 70%; but there would be no provision in
the initial legislation requiring such a majority. It would be one
of the matters that the Assembly could consider in formulating
its Report.56
It was noted above that the S.D.L.P. announced that its As-
sembly representatives would boycott the Assembly to sit in No-
vember 1982. They believed that there was no firm commitment in
the Assembly plan that a party such as theirs (largely Roman Cath-
olic) would ever be allowed to share actual power with Protestant
politicians. The new Northern Ireland Assembly was to be, at least
initially, a mere advisory body to Northern Ireland's British rul-
ers.57 The initial absence of an executive in the new Northern Ire-
land Assembly5" also helped distinguish it from the 1974 Northern
Ireland power-sharing experiment which encompassed both an as-
sembly and an executive.5 9 The S.D.L.P., in fact, had participated
55. Id. paras. 42-43, at 10-1i.
56. Id. para. 53, at 13.
57. The government proposes that:
(a) An election shall be held for a Northern Ireland Assembly.
(b) The Assembly, from its inception, will have scrutinising, deliberative and con-
sultative functions.
(c) The Assembly will also be asked to recommend to the Secretary of State ar-
rangements under which the whole or part of the range of legislative and executive
responsibilities previously transferred under the Northern Ireland Constitution Act
1973 could be exercised by the Assembly and by a devolved administration answer-
able to it.
(d) Provided certain criteria are satisfied, the Government will recommend to Par-
liament that the arrangements recommended by the Assembly should be imple-
mented and appropriate powers transferred. The Government is bringing before
Parliament a Bill to give effect to these proposals.
1d. para. 30, at 8.
58. Id. paras. 38-39, at 10; para. 51, at 12.
59. Id. paras. 26-28, at 7. The British wanted a 1974 Northern Ireland Assembly which
was not merely a consultative body, but one actually bestowed with executive powers.
Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals, Cmnd. No. 5259, para. 37, at 10, para. 71, at 18
(Mar. 1973) (available from Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, England).
387
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in that 1974 effort.6°
The Prior White Paper spoke somewhat warmly of the Anglo-
Irish Intergovernmental Council, which supposedly would facilitate
dialogue between the governments of the United Kingdom and the
Republic of Ireland.61 This also distinguished the 1982 Northern
Ireland Assembly effort from the 1974 Northern Ireland power-
sharing experiment. The 1974 effort comprehended, in contrast to
the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council,62 a Council of Ireland
oriented toward a Dublin-Belfast (not a Dublin-London) axis.
(This was the "Irish dimension" previously discussed at Section II.)
Though cast as an important intergovernmental tool, the Anglo-
Irish Intergovernmental Council was nonetheless formally belittled
by Secretary Prior as a "talking shop."6 3
IV. CONCURRENT MAJORITY POPULAR GOVERNMENT
Popular self-determination for war-torn Northern Ireland has
been a long desired, yet problematic goal. A political model based
on a concurrent majority system, however, may offer some promise
to the supporters of a populist government for Northern Ireland.
The concurrent majority formula "creates" popular self-determina-
60. See infra text at Sec. IX.
61. The Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council, which has been established fol-
lowing the Anglo-Irish talks and Joint Studies which began in 1980, gives institu-
tional expression to the unique relationship between the two governments without
affecting national sovereignty. The first meetings of the Council have taken place
and the Government is confident that these new arrangements will enhance close,
friendly and practical co-operation in the interests of all the people of the United
Kingdom. It is now for the Parliaments concerned to consider whether the govern-
mental meetings of the Council should be complemented by an Anglo-Irish body at
Parliamentary level in which members of the Parliaments of the United Kingdom
and the Republic of Ireland could take part. The Government would expect the
arrangements to enable members of the Northern Ireland Assembly to participate if
they so wished.
Northern Ireland: A Framework for Devolution, supra note 51, at 6, para. 23.
62. Relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic will in general con-
tinue to be conducted within the ambit of the Council. A devolved government in
Northern Ireland would, under existing statutory provisions, be able to make such
bilateral arrangements and agreements with the Government of the Republic
within the field of "transferred" functions as they might consider appropriate.
Practical co-operation in many forms between the two parts of Ireland has been
long established. It would be for a Northern Ireland administration to decide what
further arrangements would be in the interests of Northern Ireland.
Id. para. 24, at 6.
63. THE EcONOMIST, supra note 36, at 18. On St. Patrick's Day 1983, Irish Foreign
Minister Peter Barry was scheduled to present to U.S. President Ronald Reagan a Republic
of Ireland proposal for a new political forum which was to become the basis for dialogue
between moderate nationalist parties in both the Republic and in Northern Ireland. Dow-
ney, US eyes blueprinifor 'new Ireland', Christian Sci. Monitor, March 17, 1983, at 6, col. 1.
This proposed forum was somewhat reminiscent of the 1974 Council of Ireland.
Vol. 13
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tion by ensuring that policies are implemented only upon ratifica-
tion by every major unequally-affected political bloc.
A concurrent majority political system for Northern Ireland
would not resemble a one-person, one-vote majority rule. Never-
theless, this feature of the system does not tend to isolate it from the
traditional heritage of England's parliamentary government. As
the late, distinguished political historian Charles Austin Beard
explained:
According to a custom consecrated by time, it is the fashion
to speak of the House of Commons as representing a sort of third
estate, the commonalty of the realm. A little antiquarian in-
quiry, however, shows that the term 'Commons' does not derive
its meaning, as is often erroneously supposed, from any connec-
tion with 'the common people.' On the contrary it comes from
the vague word communitas which was used in the middle ages
to describe a political organism such as a county or chartered
town. The House of Commons, therefore, was in reality the
house of the communitates, composed of representatives of the
gentry of the counties and the burgesses of the towns considered
as collective bodies within their respective geographical areas.
Strictly speaking, we find in the lower house of Parliament the
spokesmen of two estates; the smaller landowners and the
burgesses.
The principles underlying . . . [the] medieval system of
class representation have never been entirely abandoned in Eng-
land in favor of the theory of abstract individual equality. They
were well understood by Harrington, Locke, and Burke. Indeed
the British constitution of medieval origin remained substan-
tially unchanged until 1832, when the first of the great series of
parliamentary reform bills was enacted. Although nearly half a
century had elapsed since the French Revolution let loose its
flood of liberty and equality doctrines, English reformers, even
in 1832, remained unmoved. They widened the suffrage, it is
true, but what they did in effect was to enfranchise by a set of
ingenious qualifications, another 'estate' which had grown up
with the advance of industry and commerce, namely, a body of
middle-class manufacturers and shopkeepers. In vain did the
English Chartists talk of 'one man one vote,' and universal man-
hood suffrage.'
An American lawyer's search of this English parliamentary
64. C. BEARD, THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF POLITICS AND RELATED WRITINGS 46-47
(1957).
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history for authority for the one-person, one-vote orientation, so
central in the U.S. Supreme Court's reapportionment opinions in
Baker v. Carr6 5 and Reynolds v. Sims, 66 would be unavailing. It is
"estates" which have been looked to in English parliamentary gov-
ernment. Given the history of British rule, such "estates" in North-
ern Ireland would arguably include the body of Protestants and the
body of Catholics.
The concurrent majority principle, as developed by U.S. Sena-
tor John Caldwell Calhoun of South Carolina, will be outlined at
Section V. Senator Calhoun fully presented this theory in his book,
A Disquisition on Government.67 It should be noted that the rather
antiquarian sound of Calhoun's arguments should not lead one to
dismiss Calhoun's thought as irrevocably linked to the now long-
repudiated premise of South Carolinian white supremacy.
Richard N. Current, the William F. Allen Professor of Ameri-
can History at the University of Wisconsin, made that error in 1963
when, in regard to Calhoun, he jeered:
It is farfetched to say that his 'insights remain vital for any
minority.' This might be remotely true if his theory were ab-
stracted enough, but the theory would have to be stretched to the
point where it had only the most tenuous connection with what
Calhoun actually thought and said. The assumption would have
to be made that, somehow, the case for the onetime master has
been, or at least can be, converted into a case for the onetime
slave. This assumption has yet to be proved. Perhaps the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People ought
to peruse Calhoun's works for means of protecting Negro rights.
If the N.A.A.C.P. should do so, the news would be startling, and
if the search were successful, the news would be amazing.
Surely the spirit of Calhoun is not to be found in the meet-
ings of today's minority groups, of whatever creed or color.68
Current identifies the spirit of Calhoun with that of the White Citi-
zen's Council.
69
Current's sarcastic invitation to black Americans to peruse
Calhoun was more prophetic than Current knew. In 1971 Dr.
Hanes Walton, Jr. of Savannah State College wrote in his book,
65. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
66. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
67. J. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT (C. Post ed. 1953).
68. R. CURRENT, JOHN C. CALHOUN 147 (1966), quoting A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
AGE OF JACKSON 405 (1945).
69. R. CURRENT, supra note 68, at 148-52.
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The Political Philosophy of Martin Luther King, Jr. :70
Calhoun's political theory is symbolic of a special irony in
American political thought. His doctrine of the 'concurrent ma-
jority' is a powerful formulation of the rights of minorities and of
their constant need of constitutional protection against what
Alexis de Tocqueville called 'the tyranny of the majority.'
Clearly, he makes a telling point: majorities are inclined to
trample asunder the rights of minorities, and hence they must be
restrained by organizations and instruments of power.
Ideas have a way of begetting a strange breed of children.
Calhoun is 'relevant' in a corrective, creative, and useful way to
the Black Revolution. Perhaps this is a unique brand of poetic
justice designed by the gods to mock the human condition. Sub-
stitute in his argument 'black' for the aristocratic South, the in-
terest he represented. Apply his doctrine of 'concurrent
majority' to the current racial predicament. Among the interest-
ing conclusions is the necessity of a black veto in issues of public
policy in order to promote and protect black interest.
One of these days, Calhoun is going to be rediscovered,
dusted off, updated, and used in the contemporary power and
ideological struggles. He may well become purged and 'black-
ized.' If so, the political theory of the Black Revolution will be
catalyzed, enlarged, and enriched. It would be the height of
irony if the arguments advanced, prior to the Civil War, by the
most gifted and influential apologists for black enslavement were
converted, in the waning decades of the twentieth century, into
arguments for black liberation. Ideas, sometimes, have strange
careers, ambiguous legacies, and complex destinies--to the em-
barrassment and chagrin of their originators. Once afloat the
continuum of history, they are free agents and often rebellious
ones.
7 1
The present discussion suggests, in part, that Calhoun's
thought can be "blackized." Indeed, his reasoning can be directed
toward popular liberation, rather than being employed to prop up
an entrenched elite, such as in the antebellum South. This possibil-
ity justifies a closer look at Calhoun's Disquisition, notwithstanding
any antiquarian flavor to the following abridgement of his work.
70. H. WALTON, JR., THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
(1971).
71. Id. at xvi-xviii.
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V. CONCURRENT MAJORITY THEORY/NORTHERN
IRELAND REALITY
The October 20, 1982, Northern Ireland Assembly balloting
drew many citizens to the polls. In this context, it is important to
observe that Calhoun was critically friendly to the popular
franchise:
The right of suffrage, of itself, can do no more than give
complete control to those who elect over the conduct of those
they have elected ....
The more perfectly it does this, the more perfectly it accom-
plishes its ends; but in doing so, it only changes the seat of au-
thority without counteracting, in the least, the tendency of the
government to oppression and abuse of its powers.
If the whole community had the same interests so that the
interests of each and every portion would be so affected by the
action of the government that the laws which oppressed or im-
poverished one portion would necessarily oppress and impover-
ish all others-or the reverse-then the right of suffrage, of itself,
would be all-sufficient to counteract the tendency of the govern-
ment to oppression and abuse of its powers, and, of course,
would form, of itself, a perfect constitutional government ....
But such is not the case. On the contrary, nothing is more
difficult than to equalize the action of the government in refer-
ence to the various and diversified interests of the community;
and nothing more easy than to pervert its powers into instru-
ments to aggrandize and enrich one or more interests by oppress-
ing and impoverishing the others; and this, too, under the
operation of laws couched in general terms and which, on their
face, appear fair and equal.72
The Disquisition's abstract reasoning tends arguably to fit the
long-term Northern Ireland picture. The right of suffrage has been
obtained, but is perceived by the minority community as leading to
governmental oppression and the abuse of power. To many, the
Northern Ireland populace is divided into those aggrandized and
72. J. CALHOUN, supra note 67, at 12-13. When Calhoun highlights the impossibility of
an economically neutral state apparatus, he anticipates Pulitzer Prize-winning political jour-
nalist Dr. George F. Will:
Merely by having fiscal and monetary policies and a budget, government has a
profound effect on economic life. To choose certain policies rather than others, and
to spend $750 billion in certain ways rather than other ways, is to choose to shape
the economy in certain ways rather than others. The one choice no government
has, least of all a welfare state in a developed democracy, is 'nonintervention.'
Will, Waltz of the Lame Ducks, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1982, at 158.
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enriched by the perversion of the governmental power, and their
victims.
The 1979 memoirs of Sir Harold Wilson, former Prime Minis-
ter of Britain, recalled with approval his address of May 28, 1974:
My own speech the following day was concerned with two
main points, one, to emphasize the argument about the vast
assistance given by Westminster to help unemployment in the
Province [Northern Ireland], and two, to open up a debate about
the future.
On finance, we had provided £ 70 million for the Harland
and Wolff shipyard, 'where the employment is almost 100 per-
cent from a single religious community.' Yet it was Harland
workers who more than any had denied their fellow Ulstermen
the right to work.73
Sir Harold rightly acknowledged that the employment situation in
Northern Ireland has been economically manipulated on a grand
scale by the British government. The result is employees and em-
ployers from a "single religious community" who keep their neigh-
bors out of work. Calhoun would understand this.
Compare the words of Prime Minister Wilson with this 1970
journalistic assessment:
Catholics make up a third of the population, a half million in the
North's one and a half million, but their children are just over
half the elementary school enrollment. It is only heavy Catholic
emigration to English factory jobs that has held down Catholic
numbers at a later-which is to say voting-age. Catholics leave
because of discrimination and lack of jobs. Protestants dominate
mercantile and industrial management; in an area of high job-
lessness a job given a Catholic means one less for a Protestant.
Unionists are favored overwhelmingly in local government jobs.
It is easy to see why the Unionists have sought to oppress
and hold down the Catholic minority. More jobs and fairer eco-
nomic treatment could mean fewer Catholics emigrating to Eng-
land, more remaining in the Six Counties and able to have a
political voice.74
This, too, Calhoun would understand.
73. H. WILSON, supra note 53, at 77.
74. C. LUCEY, IRELAND AND THE IRISH 222 (1970) (emphasis added).
[T]he northern Government at Stormont in Belfast and the local authorities are,
perhaps, the biggest employers in the area. Invariably they hire Protestants. In ad-
dition, British and foreign firms are opening factories in Northern Ireland, attracted
by concessions similar to those offered in the Republic. A heavy preponderance of
these factories is being placed in areas in which the population is predominantly
Protestant. This is reflected in the unemployment figures. In Antrim, 1.6 per cent
393
16
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 3 [1983], Art. 9
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol13/iss3/9
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
From similar understandings, Calhoun concluded:
Such being the case, it necessarily results that the right of
suffrage, by placing the control of the government in the commu-
nity, must . . . lead to conflict among its different interests-
each striving to obtain possession of its powers as the means of
protecting itself against the others or of advancing its respective
interests regardless of the interests of others. For this purpose, a
struggle will take place between the various interests to obtain a
majority in order to control the government ....
When once formed, the community will be divided into two
great parties-a major and minor-between which there will be
incessant struggles on the one side to retain, and on the other to
obtain the majority and, thereby, the control of the government
and the advantages it confers.75
As previously suggested, Northern Ireland is divided into two great
parties, or "estates," each incessantly struggling for the "control of
the government and the advantages it confers."
The Disquisition, read in the perspective of modern Northern
Ireland, seems to be the counsel of despair. However, Calhoun
prescribes a remedy:
As, then, the right of suffrage, without some provision, can-
not counteract this tendency of government, the next question
for consideration is, What is that other provision? This demands
the most serious consideration, for of all the questions embraced
in the science of government it involves a principle, the most im-
portant and the least understood, and when understood, the most
difficult of application in practice. It is, indeed, emphatically
that principle which makes the constitution, in its strict and lim-
ited sense.
From what has been said, it is manifest that this provision
must be of a character calculated to prevent any one interest or
combination of interests from using the powers of government to
aggrandize itself at the expense of the others. . . . There is but
one certain mode in which this result can be secured, and that is
by the adoption of some restriction or limitation which shall so
of men are out of work; in Ballymena, 3.6; in Lisburn, 3.6; and in Bangor, 4.1. An
these are Protestant areas.
In Derry, 17.1 per cent are unemployed, in Newry, 17.5, in Enniskillen, 20.6,
and in Strabane, 24.1, nearly a quarter of the adult male population. All of these
are Catholic areas.
Unionists argue that the sites are chosen by the incoming industrialists, not by
them. The Republic, however, seems to be able to diversify its new industry so that
it will help areas where employment is needed.
A. BESTIC, THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING IRISH 175 (1969)(emphasis added).
75. J. CALHOUN, supra note 67, at 14.
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effectually prevent any one interest or combination of interests
from obtaining the exclusive control of the government as to
render hopeless all attempts directed to that end. There is, again,
but one mode in which this can be effected, and that is by taking
the sense of each interest or portion of community which may be
unequally and injuriously affected by the action of the govern-
ment separately, through its own majority or in some other way
by which its voice may be fairly expressed, and to require the
consent of each interest either to put or to keep the government
in action. This, too, can be accomplished only in one way, and
that is by such an organism of the government-and, if necessary
for the purpose, of the community also-as will, by dividing and
distributing the powers of government, give to each division or
interest, through its appropriate organ, either a concurrent voice
in making and executing the laws or a veto on their execution.76
Since the British government during 1982 endeavored to create
something of an embryonic Northern Ireland constitution, it should
well have apprehended the Calhounian view of a mutual veto
mechanism (or "organism"):
Such an organism as this, combined with the right of suf-
frage, constitutes, in fact, the elements of constitutional govern-
ment. The one, by rendering those who make and execute the
laws responsible to those on whom they operate, prevents the
rulers from oppressing the ruled; and the other, by making it im-
possible for any one interest or combination of interests, or class,
or order, or portion of the community to obtain exclusive con-
trol, prevents any one of them from oppressing the other.77
But does a mutual veto "organism" not preclude the political
community's self-determination? And is self-determination riot the
whole point of the electoral process? In Northern Ireland, after all,
there are two hostile elements or "estates" advocating self-determi-
nation. Calhoun asserts that the concurrent majority political sys-
tem does not frustrate but actually enhances the political
community's self-determination:
It may be readily inferred, from what has been stated, that
the effect of organism is neither to supersede nor diminish the
importance of the right of suffrage, but to aid and perfect it. The
object of the latter is to collect the sense of the community. . ..
It is only when aided by a proper organism that it can collect the
sense of the entire community, of each and all its interests-of
76. Id. at 19-20 (emphasis in the original).
77. Id. at 21.
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each, through its appropriate organ, and of the whole through all
of them united ....
It results, from what has been said, that there are two differ-
ent modes in which the sense of the community may be taken:
one, simply by the right of suffrage, unaided; the other, by the
right through a proper organism. . . . But one regards numbers
only and considers the whole community as a unit having but
one common interest throughout, and collects the sense of the
greater number of the whole as that of the community. The
other, on the contrary, regards interests as well as numbers-
considering the community as made up of different and conflict-
ing interests, as far as the action of the government is con-
cerned-and takes the sense of each through its majority or
appropriate organ, and the united sense of all as the sense of the
entire community. The former of these I shall call the numerical
or absolute majority, and the latter, the concurrent or constitu-
tional majority. I call it the constitutional majority because it is
an essential element in every constitutional government, be its
form what it may.
If the numerical majority were really the people, and if to
take its sense truly were to take the sense of the people truly, a
government so constituted would be a true and perfect model of
a popular constitutional government; and every departure from
it would detract from its excellence. But as such is not the case,
as the numerical majority, instead of being the people, is only a
portion of them, such a government, instead of being a true and
perfect model of the people's government, that is, a people self-
governed, is but the government of a part over a part-the major
over the minor portion.
78
The Sinn Fein, Alliance Party, and S.D.L.P. elements of the
Northern Ireland electorate might emphatically agree with the Dis-
quisition that the Northern Ireland numerical majority is not the
entire people, but only a faction thereof. Many of those voters
would agree that a numerical majority government is but govern-
ment by the major portion over the minor portion of the populace.
78. Id. at 22-24.
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VI. A CONCURRENT MAJORITY NORTHERN
IRELAND ASSEMBLY
A. The Lay of the Land in Northern Ireland
A legislative assembly utilizing the concurrent majority theory
finds the legislators formally constituted into, at a minimum, two
blocs. Legislative passage of proposed legislation hinges upon con-
sent by a majority of the legislators from each of these two blocs-
the overall majority is comprised of two "concurring" majorities.
Government is not merely by one bloc over the other.
Largely because of the long history of British rule over North-
ern Ireland, the populace finds itself divided into Protestant (rough-
ly, Unionist) and Catholic (roughly, nationalist) blocs. "While not
every Protestant was a Unionist or every Catholic a nationalist,
there was and is a very close correlation between religious and
political affiliation in Northern Ireland."79 The application of a
concurrent majority theory inevitably raises the question of how
elected legislators might be formally organized to represent these
two blocs.
Northern Ireland was created from six of the nine counties of
the entire Irish province of Ulster: Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fer-
managh, Londonderry and Tyrone. In addition, Northern Ireland
encompasses the two county boroughs--cities with county status-
of Belfast and Londonderry.
The 1971 population of Northern Ireland was 1,525,187. Bel-
fast, on Ireland's east coast and Northern Ireland's largest city, had
a population of 360,200. Londonderry, easily the second largest
city, had a population of 51,900.
Catholics constituted local majorities in County Tyrone (1971
population, 139,000) and in the contiguous County Fermanagh
(1971 population, 49,960). These are Northern Ireland's western-
most counties. Catholics also constituted a local majority in the
City of Londonderry, a seaport on the extreme western edge of
Northern Ireland. These two western counties on the border of the
Irish Republic and this westerly borough create an obvious nation-
alistic "western tendency" of about 240,860 persons within North-
ern Ireland.
A concurrent majority formula for a Northern Ireland legisla-
ture could thus find its Unionist and its nationalist blocs tending to
be derived naturally from regions already identifiable as Unionist-
79. J. CURRAN, THE BIRTH OF THE IRISH FREE STATE 1921-1923, at 296 n. 6 (1980).
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voting and nationalist-voting. Counties Tyrone and Fermanagh
and the City of Londonderry presumably could represent such na-
tionalist regions. Moreover, The Economist, in analyzing the Octo-
ber 20, 1982, election returns speculated that "the S.D.L.P. could
stand a good chance of winning in. . .Newry and Armagh, and
maybe in South Down, too."80 These are southerly portions of
Northern Ireland which (like Counties Tyrone and Fermanagh,
and the City of Londonderry) are near or on the Republic of Ire-
land border.
Arguably, a "border tendency" versus a "northeastern ten-
dency" method for identifying geographically-linked blocs in a
Northern Ireland legislature could be devised.8 The passage of
legislation would thus depend upon consent by majorities from
both the "northeastern tendency" region8 2 and the "border ten-
dency" region, regardless of the actual population of either region.
A power-sharing Northern Ireland -Executive, simultaneously
drawn from both nationalist and (especially) Unionist parties,
would only enforce Northern Ireland laws acceptable to both great
factions of the populace.83 It will be seen that just such a power-
80. THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 1982, at 52.
81. One might arguably read the text as signaling something of a division between
northeast Belfast and its border area "suburbs":
Belfast is Ulster's only metropolis. There are other cities, but they are hardly more
than overgrown towns. Most of Northern Ireland could as well be a quiet corner of
northern England or Scotland. It is a small, compact province which, so long as it
remains apart from the rest of Ireland, exists as a kind of Britain in miniature.
Perhaps it is best thought of as a city-state: Belfast the city, the rest of Ulster a
sprawling suburb.
D. CONNERY, THE IRISH 251 (1968).
82. Preliminary 1981 census reports showed a decline in the Belfast population of 25 per
cent between 1971 and 1981, the decrease being considerably lower for Catholics than for the
major Protestant denominations. Belfast population dips 25% in the last decade, The Sun/The
Daily Herald, Jan. 1, 1983, at A9, col. 3.
83. A peaceful polity enforcing only laws acceptable to both factions could theoretically
be the desire of the community. Earlier stages of Northern Ireland government have encom-
passed simple numerical majority rule, which progressed from oppression and abuse of
power to use of force by the I.R.A. and British military occupation. The circumstances of the
conflict today arguably could lead to compromise giving both Unionist and nationalist par-
ties participation in the government:
A constitution, to succeed, must spring from the bosom of the community and
be adapted to the intelligence and character of the people and all the multifarious
relations, internal and external, which distinguish one people from another. If it
does not, it will prove in practice to be not a constitution, but a cumbrous and
useless machine which must be speedily superseded and laid aside for some other
more simple and better suited to their condition.
It would thus seem almost necessary that governments should commence in
some one of the simple and absolute forms which, however well suited to the com-
munity in its earlier stages, must in its progress lead to oppression and abuse of
power and finally to an appeal to force--to be succeeded by a military despotism-
Vol. 13
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sharing Northern Ireland Executive has, in fact, obtained at least
once.
B. The Supermajority Distinguished
The concurrent majority formula should not be confused with
a supermajority voting formula, such as the seventy-percent rule of
James Prior, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Such a
supermajority formula might be characterized as a psuedo-concur-
rent majority. If a populace is divided-as is the Northern Ireland
population-into blocs of sixty-five percent and thirty-five percent,
then a seventy-percent supermajority requirement only ensures
that, minimally, a small fraction of the minority element (five of the
thirty-five percent) must always be logrolled into an adequate
supermajority coalition. A concurrent majority formula, by con-
trast, guarantees that most of the representatives of each faction
must consent to legislative proposals in order to make them laws.
Under the latter theory, the requisite consenting proportion of
the legislature would be much less than a large supermajority.
Concurrent majorities derived from a sixty-five/thirty-five percent
division would need only thirty-three percent and eighteen percent,
respectively. The requisite lawmaking total of fifty-one percent is
far less than a large supermajority. In the abstract a supermajority
of seventy percent appears far less workable than a concurrent ma-
jority of fifty-one percent.
Even if a concurrent majority government for Northern Ire-
land appears unrealistic, this option must nevertheless be appraised
in the perspective of all other options. In politics, and especially in
constitution-making, the alternative finally chosen sometimes can-
not be the most theoretically desired or satisfactory choice. It must
often be the least unsatisfactory of the given range of alternatives,
each of which is unsatisfactory in part.
VII. THE RULE-OR-RUIN CONCURRENT MAJORITY PROBLEM
Political scientist Dr. James MacGregor Burns, in his re-
nowned 1963 study of American politics entitled The Deadlock of
unless the conflicts to which it leads should be fortunately adjusted by a compro-
mise which will give to the respective parties a participation in the control of the
government, and thereby lay the foundation of a constitutional government to be
afterwards matured and perfected. Such governments have been, emphatically, the
product of circumstances.
J. CALHOUN, supra note 67, at 60-61.
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Democracy, 4 recognized "the brilliance of a John Calhoun."85 He
also appreciated the Senator's "brilliant argumentation." 6 Burns
acknowledged that Calhoun's "main contribution [was] the doc-
trine of concurrent majority rule-rule by a consensus of all the
major sections and interests rather than by a simple majority of the
people cutting across regions, groups and classes." 7
However, there was little chance that Professor Bums would
characterize Calhoun's efforts as heroic.8" What is the problem with
the concurrent majority principle that has slowed idealists to its ac-
ceptance and pragmatists to its implementation?
A possible built-in difficulty with the concurrent majority prin-
ciple was recently pinpointed by Queen's University Professor of
Economics Dan Usher in his 1981 treatise, The Economic Prerequi-
site to Democracy. 9 This supposed problem can be characterized
as rule-or-ruin "ransom bargaining" which threatens political
negotiators, bound to the unanimity principle, with deadlock:
The ideal would be to replace majority rule with unanimity,
such as arises automatically in exchanges in a free market. If I
have bread and you have cheese, a voluntary agreement between
us to exchange some of my bread for some of your cheese is
unanimous if we two constitute the whole of society, and it pre-
serves some of the character of unanimity when there are more
than two people because the rest of the population preserves
what it had before our agreement was struck. Voting is different.
If you, I and a third party constitute a community with unlimited
majority rule, you and I can combine to take what we please
from the third party. The problem of faction. . . can be looked
upon as arising because the essential unanimity required for
commercial transaction does not extend to transactions in the
political realm. The proposed solution is to make unanimity a
requirement in politics as well.
Though unanimity is the ideal, it is not advocated in prac-
tice because of bargaining anomalies that would result. If una-
nimity is required for the passage of a new law, it becomes
profitable for any man to hold the community to ransom by
threatening to vote against the law even when he personally
84. J. BURNS, supra note 46.
85. Id. at 355.
86. Id. at 57.
87. Id.
88. "Calhoun's doctrine was a reversion to the Articles of Confederation; it was a per-
version, though perhaps a logical one, of the Madisonian model." Id.
89. D. USHER, THE ECONOMIC PREREQUISITE TO DEMOCRACY (1981).
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stands to gain from having it passed. Imagine a community of
15 people, each with an income of $10 initially, and suppose the
effect of a proposed law would be to raise every man's income to
$11. Each man has an incentive to vote for the law, but Mr 1
may announce that he will vote against it unless given a pre-
mium of, say $2.80 ($0.20 from each of the remaining voters)
over and above the $1 he would get automatically. Since each
voter is in a position to make such a threat, it becomes difficult to
pass laws at all, and society becomes completely rigid or less
prosperous than it might otherwise be.9"
Professor Usher apprehends that if interbloc unanimity is re-
quired for passage of a new law, it conceivably can profit a rule-or-
ruin bloc to seek a "ransom" by threatening a veto even though the
vetoing faction itself would benefit from passage. Professor Usher's
insight demonstrates that effectuation of the concurrent majority
principle can facilitate interfactional confrontation, and not the in-
terfactional conciliation anticipated by Calhoun. The question re-
mains as to whether Usher's argument refutes the operation of the
concurrent majority as envisioned by Calhoun.
Usher refutes Calhoun only insofar as Usher demonstrates
that a concurrent majority (minority veto) system is likely to prove
impractical where the perceived profit to a veto-wielding bloc in
seeking "ransom" from its companion blocs exceeds the perceived
profit in acquiescence. Where the perceived profit in acquiescence
and cooperation is deemed large, a concurrent majority principle is
likely to prove workable.
VIII. THE SECURITY COUNCIL EXPERIMENT
Theoretically, Calhoun's concurrent majority system can sur-
vive Usher's apprehension. The practical test is in those real-world
circumstances where veto-wielding factions perceive competing
90. Id. at 116-17.
It is in order to avoid this outcome, and to draw a balance between the difficulties
of majority rule and the costs of change under a unanimity rule, that people who
favour unanimity as an ideal are usually inclined to advocate a two-thirds or three-
quarters rule instead.
Specifically, the new constitutionalism is reflected in a number of proposed
amendments, some adopted and some not, to the constitutions of certain states of
the United States. The amendments differ in detail from state to state, but they
always require something more than a simple majority of the legislature-perhaps
a referendum or a two-thirds majority-for tax rates to be increased. California's
Proposition 13 also reduced property taxes by over 50 per cent and included a suffi-
ciently small inflation adjustment that the real value of taxes can be expected to
decline from year to year if inflation continues at its present rate.
Id. at 117.
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profit options. Such circumstances resemble, to some degree, the
use of the veto in the United Nations Security Council. The veto
there often has been used to actively pursue, or passively defend,
diplomatic ends existing independently of U.N. goals. However,
the acid test of the feasibility of the concurrent majority principle
lies in the absence of "ransom bargaining." The questions of im-
portance in this regard are: (1) whether the veto has been used to
frustrate some Security Council partners from effectuating policy
until a tribute ("ransom") has been paid to a permanent Security
Council member who would have benefited from or, at least, been
unharmed by the policy; and (2) if so, how often has this occurred?
Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that:
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one
vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters
shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters
shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including
the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that,
in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article
52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.91
Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations provides for the
pacific settlement of disputes.9 2 Article 52(3) provides: "The Se-
curity Council shall encourage the development of pacific settle-
ment of local disputes through .. .regional arrangements or by
. .. regional agencies either on the initiative of the states con-
cerned or by reference from the Security Council.
9 3
A strict interpretation of Article 27 would demand a positive
concurrence of the permanent members, instead of a simple acqui-
escence via abstention, for a decision of the Security Council on
issues of substance.94 However, quite early in its history the Secur-
ity Council established the principle that abstention by a great
power failed to constitute a veto. This followed a precedent set by
the League of Nations.95 Moreover, the Security Council also
adopted the principle that a great power's absence is analogous to
91. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, paras. 1-3.
92. Id. arts. 33-38.
93. Id. art. 52, para. 3.
94. I. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF
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abstention and therefore also lacks the effect of a veto.9 6
American legal thinking offers a primary and, perhaps, deci-
sive role in justifying the veto power of the permanent members of
the Security Council. Prior to the American Civil War, a pro-
tracted assessment and intensive development of Romanist notions
of the veto power of plebian tribunes occurred. 97 This American
contribution is preeminent due to its remarkably high theoretical
level.98 It attained its greatest significance between 1848 and 1850
through Calhoun's theoretical work. Calhoun seized upon, ex-
panded and justified the principle of the veto power.99 He appar-
ently had hoped "to become, in practice, Calhoun, the American
Tribune.' ' "o
The Article 27 provision permitting a permanent member of
the Security Council to negative action on controversies involving
itself (other than those involving the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes) is, from the perspective of those favoring the progressive de-
velopment of practicable international organizations, °0 one of the
most destructive aspects of the veto arrangement. Professor Peter
F. Drucker, who emphasizes the significance of the concurrent ma-
jority as an extralegal facet of American politics, avers that the con-
current majority can never be made official in any effective
government. 0 2 He specifically cites the express veto granted the
great powers by the U.N. Charter as an example.
0 3
The acceptance of the veto by the founding fathers of the
United Nations demonstrates their vivid understanding that the
great powers would never fully place their resources at the com-
mand of a numerical majority.'" The original hope that the re-
quirement of unanimity among the great powers on major Security
Council issues would itself stimulate the achievement of unanimity
has been dashed. 05 During the cold war period, the use of the veto
demonstrated the depth of the East-West cleavage rather than facil-
96. Id. at 142-43.
97. Franklin, The Roman Origin and the American Jusification of the Tribunitial or Veto
Power in the Charter of the United Nations, 22 TUL. L. REV. 24, 25 (1947).
98. Id. at 25.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 26
101. I. CLAUDE, supra note 94, at 139.
102. Drucker, A Key to American Politics. Calhoun's Pluralism, in JOHN C. CALHOUN: A
PROFILE 133, 135 n. 3 (J. Thomas, ed. 1968).
103. Id.
104. I. CLAUDE, supra note 94, at 139.
105. Id. at 146.
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itating unanimity. 1°6 Upon a preliminary assessment, this would
appear to provide evidence against the concurrent majority princi-
ple. A more detailed analysis, however, reveals a contrary finding.
In 1966, toward the close of the so-called cold war era, Alf
Ross said of U.N. Security Council practice:
There are probably some who, though they can accept the
veto rule in principle, think that Russia has misused the power of
veto. In my opinion, it is difficult to draw the line between use and
misuse in afield so strongly marked by conflicts of high political
interests. The Russians, especially since the Korean conflict,
have considered the United Nations to be an instrument of
Western policy, in which the Soviet Union, and the Eastern bloc
as a whole, found itself in a permanent minority. The Security
Council soon developed into a theater of the cold war. In this situa-
tion, the Soviet Union is hardly to be blamedfor making the most
of the rules of voting to block political moves by its opponents.
True, there have been cases where the Russians, especially in the
double veto maneuver, have used the voting rules in a manner
incompatible with good faith. However, it is just as true that
there have been cases in which the Western powers have made
use, just as ruthlessly, of the power of the President under the
rules of procedure to force through a high-handed decision
107
In Ross's view, it is difficult to distinguish between veto use
and abuse in an arena of sharply conflicting political interests. One
learns that it is difficult to distinguish between vetoes inspired by
what Usher might call the pursuit of legitimate interest and vetoes
inspired by ransom bargaining. When Ross recalled that the Secur-
ity Council became a cold war arena in which the USSR was
"hardly to be blamed" for vetoing "political moves by its oppo-
nents," he was suggesting that the USSR was largely motivated by
legitimate interest (specifically, its overall long-term defense) rather
than ransom bargaining.
Thus, the Security Council veto (or minimally, its use by the
Soviet Union until 1966) arguably passes the Usher test: the veto-
unanimity requirement in a concurrent majority system had infre-
quently been used to frustrate Security Council partners from effec-
tuating policies until those partners paid a tribute to the USSR,
which would have benefited or been unharmed by the proposed
106. Id.
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policies. Also, evidence that the 1945-66 Security Council veto was
abused by non-Soviet actors for ransom bargaining among them-
selves appears nearly nonexistent.
One might object that the concurrent majority scheme of the
Security Council ordinarily encompasses issues that are not vital to
the veto-bearer. Moreover, the veto-bearers themselves are rela-
tively rational diplomatic actors. How would the Usher test fare if
the veto were applicable in the domestic politics of an apparently
rule-or-ruin interbloc context, such as 1975-82 Lebanon, the Re-
public of South Africa or Northern Ireland?
IX. THE 1974 NORTHERN IRELAND EXPERIMENT
The U.K. Northern Ireland Assembly Act and the Northern
Ireland Constitution Act of August 1973 envisaged both a single-
chamber Assembly of seventy-eight members and an Executive.'0 8
Assembly members would be elected by proportional representa-
tion. The Executive would represent the entire community and
would not be solely based on any single party. A June 1973 North-
ern Ireland Assembly election"° returned twenty-seven Unionists
and Loyalists opposed to power sharing, and nineteen S.D.L.P.,
eight Alliance Party, one N.I.L.P." ° and twenty-two Official
Unionist' " Assemblypersons who supported power sharing. The
Official Unionists had won 211,362 votes, which was only slightly
lower than the 235,873 votes of the anti-power-sharing
Unionists.' 12
The various types of Unionists (Official and others) together
constituted a majority but were forbidden to separately form an
Executive."l 3 In November 1973 an agreement was reached among
108. P. BUCKLAND, A HISTORY OF NORTHERN IRELAND 165-66 (1981); see also D. BIR-
RELL & A. MURIE, POLICY AND GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND: LESSONS OF DEvo-
LUTION 73 (1980).
109. D. BIRRELL & A. MURIE, .supra note 108, at 74.
110. Id.
111. P. BUCKLAND, supra note 108.
112. Id.
113. Id. As the British government averred of the Northern Ireland majority and
minority:
What has to be found-through their representatives-is a system of exercising ex-
ecutive power in Northern Ireland which is broadly acceptable to them. One im-
portant means of ensuring this will be more effective participation by the Assembly
as a whole, through its structure of committees, in the development of policy; but it
is the view of the Government that the Executive itself can no longer be solely
based upon any single party, if that party draws its support and its elected represen-
tation virtually entirely from only one section of a divided community.
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three parties-the Official Unionists, Alliance Party and S.D.L.P.-
to form an Executive and an administration. 1 4 This government
was born, in the words of Northern Ireland historian Patrick Buck-
land, of Britain's "insistence on a compulsory coalition.""15 The
eleven members of the Executive and four members of the adminis-
tration were comprised of seven Unionists, six S.D.L.P. members
and two Alliance Party members. 16 The Executive took office on
January 1, 1974.117
The Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive survived for al-
most five months. Assessments of the Executive's record were
mixed.lI The Northern Ireland government had been hindered al-
most immediately by British Prime Minister Edward Heath's Feb-
ruary 7, 1974, call for a February 28, 1974, general election." 9
The power-sharing Northern Ireland government began to col-
lapse after the Assembly declaration of May 14, 1974. In general,
the declaration endorsed the December 6-10, 1973, agreement at
Sunningdale, Berkshire, between the Northern Ireland Executive
and representatives from Britain and Eire. The agreement called
for a Council of Ireland consisting of ministers from the Northern
Ireland Executive and Eire. 20 The Assembly's anti-power-sharing
Unionists had debated on this issue in March. The debate, how-
ever, dragged on for two months because the Unionists seemed
more interested in creating a noisy diversion than facing a losing
Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals, supra note 59, para. 52, at 13. See also id. para.
44, at II (in regard to Committees of the 1974 Assembly).
114. D. BIRRELL & A. MuRiE, supra note 108, at 74.
115. P. BUCKLAND, supra note 108, at 166.
116. D. BIRRELL & A. MUIE, supra note 108, at 77.
117. P. BUCKLAND, supra note 108, at 170.
118. D. BIRRELL & A. MURIE, supra note 108, at 79-80.
119. P. BUCKLAND, supra note 108, at 170.
120. Id. at 168-72; D. BIRRELL & A. MURIE, supra note 108, at 75-81. The British seem
to long have anticipated this move:
[Flollowing elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Government will invite
the Government of the Republic of Ireland and the leaders of the elected represent-
atives of Northern Ireland opinion to participate with them in a conference to dis-
cuss how the three objectives set out in the Paper for Discussion may best be
pursued, that is:
(a) the acceptance of the present status of Northern Ireland, and of the possibil-
ity-which would have to be compatible with the principle of consent---of subse-
quent change in that status;
(b) effective consultation and co-operation in Ireland for the benefit of North and
South alike; and
(c) the provision of a firm basis for concerted governmental and community ac-
tion against terrorist organisations.
Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals, supra note 59, para. 112, at 30.
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vote. 12i
On May 14, 1974, the loyalist Ulster Worker's Council called a
general strike. The strike had merely nominal support on the first
day. 122 "In view of talk of Ulster nationalism and an independent
Ulster, the strikers' main demand was surprisingly limited-an im-
mediate general election, which, in the light of the recent United
Kingdom election, would have meant the return of a large anti-
Sunningdale, anti-power-sharing majority."'
' 23
The strikers' control of electric power stations was their key
weapon. 124 The Executive was finally brought down on May 28 by
Unionist resignations resulting from Britain's refusal to break the
strike. 1 25  Westminster prorogued the Assembly on May 29.126
Buckland favorably quoted S.D.L.P. historian Dr. Ian McAllister
in characterizing this extraparliamentary strike as "the Protestant
veto"' 27 of the Sunningdale agreement.
121. F. LONGFORD & A. MCHARDY, ULSTER 168 (1981).
122. D. BIRRELL & A. MURIE, supra note 108, at 81.
The argument still continues about the extent of support that the strikers really
had at six pm on 14 May 1974, and whether it could have been stopped by deter-
mined government action. Certainly in its first hours, the Executive thought it
could be defeated, even though they were well aware of serious loyalist dissatisfac-
tion. Thousands ignored the strike call on the first morning and set off for work as
usual. Many were 'persuaded' to change their minds by the threats of paramilitary
gangs and their barricades. Each day had its snowball effect.
F. LONGFORD & A. MCHARDY, supra note 121, at 168.
123. P. BUCKLAND, supra note 108, at 171.
124. D. BIRRELL & A. MURIE, supra note 108, at 81; P. BUCKLAND supra note 108, at
171; F. LONGFORD & A. MCHARDY, supra note 121, at 168.
125. F. LONGFORD & A. MCHARDY, supra note 121, at 170.
There [are] some grounds for the view that firmer action by [Britain's Northern
Ireland Secretary] Merlyn Rees on 15 May might have brought the Loyalist strike
to an early end and have averted the collapse of the power-sharing administration.
Certainly the members of the Executive remain firmly of the opinion that they were
let down by the British. Their conviction that determined action by the security
forces on the first full day of the strike, 15 May, would have saved the situtation is
reflected in the force with which even the [S.D.L.P.] argues that any devolved gov-
ernment in Belfast should control the police. In 1974 the Executive had no control
over either the army or the RUC. Its repeated demands to the British government
to order the soldiers to stop intimidation by the strikers were largely ignored. There
were some half-hearted moves but far more typical were the scenes, witnessed on
television screens everywhere of soldiers chatting in friendly fashion with burly
Loyalist toughs.
Id. The British seem to have intended to retain extensive police powers all along. Northern
Ireland Constitutional Proposals, supra note 59, paras. 68-70, at 17-18.
126. D. BIRRELL & A. MURIE, supra note 108, at 81; P. BUCKLAND, supra note 108, at
170-72.
127. "'[T]he UWC strike, was similar in aim but different in form to the Protestant veto
originally used to prevent the application of the third Home Rule Bill to Ulster in 1912.' " P.
BUCKLAND, supra note 108, at 173, quoting I. MCALLISTER, THE NORTHERN IRELAND SO-
CIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOUR PARTY: POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY 146
(1977). This paralleling by McAllister and Buckland of two Northern Ireland Protestant
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This historical background has been reviewed to point out that
the pro-power-sharing Official Unionists, with only 24,511 less
votes than the Unionists opposed to power sharing, reluctantly ac-
cepted a Northern Ireland Assembly even without an institutional-
ized Protestant veto over Assembly measures. An absolute
majority of Unionist voters might conceivably have embraced
power sharing had they been reassuringly guaranteed a concurrent
majority system.
In applying the Usher test to the seemingly rule-or-ruin inter-
bloc conflict of 1974 Northern Ireland, one finds that the veto-bear-
ing actors, the extraparliamentary Protestants, did not abuse their
veto for ransom bargaining. The Protestant extraparliamentary
veto was not invoked during the 4/2 months of Assembly and Exec-
utive power sharing on issues considered not vital to the Protes-
tants. The extraparliamentary veto was used only for an issue that
was considered vital: the Sunningdale agreement's "Council of Ire-
land, which was perceived as an embryo [sic] all-Ireland
parliament."
28
During 198 1, Lord Longford, a member of the Wilson Cabinet
from 1964-68, and Anne McHardy of The Guardian noted that it
was not power sharing, but the Council of Ireland proposal of the
Sunningdale agreement which the Unionists rejected. They re-
called that at Sunningdale
[Prime Minister] Heath lost his patience with the Unionists and
chose to bully them into accepting a Council of Ireland with con-
siderably more power than they were prepared to accept. They
knew that they would be unable to sell it to their electorate. The
Irish, according to those in attendance on talks, could hardly be-
lieve the extent of the concessions on the Council. They had
been prepared to accept much less.1
29
When the elected Unionists were, in effect, denied an institutional
extraparliamentary vetoes is quite proper. D. MACARDLE, THE IRISH REPUBLIC 83-88
(1965).
128. D. BIRRELL & A. MIU~E, supra note 108, at 80.
129. F. LONGFORD & A. MCHARDY, supra note 121, at 158. If the import attached to the
Council of Ireland appears excessive, Sir Harold Wilson erases any doubt of its contribution:
This Sunningdale Conference agreed on 9 December on declarations on the consti-
tutional status of Northern Ireland, and also on proposals for setting up a Council
for Ireland, North and South, and on the establishment of a British-Irish Commis-
sion to deal with cross-border acts of violence. It was a move towards the North-
South consultations which led to the crisis of May 1974, which caused the destruction
of the Executive.
H. WILSON, supra note 53, at 70 (emphasis added).
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veto, 130 their Protestant "electorate" took its own veto to the streets.
The strain on power sharing was inevitable.
Thus, Northern Ireland power sharing failed largely because
of the Heath government's imposition of the Council of Ireland
plan and the Wilson government's refusal to support the Northern
Ireland Executive when it was embroiled in the same Council is-
sue.' 31 Lord Longford and McHardy stated:
The resignation of the Executive brought a brave attempt at
community government to an end. Northern Ireland returned
once more to direct rule from Westminster. The paramilitary
strike enforcers in their dark glasses had succeeded. The argu-
ment over where the blame for its collapse should be laid contin-
ues, but it seems that some firmer action by [British Northern
Ireland Secretary] Rees might have prevented its collapse in the
face of the Loyalist strike and allowed it more time to prove
whether it was capable of governing.'
32
130. The British government in 1973 expressly rejected an institutionalized veto for the
electorates wielding their veto in the streets:
There is no future for devolved institutions of government in Northern Ireland un-
less majority and minority alike can be so bound. This is not to say that any 'right
of veto' can be conceded to violent, subversive or unconstructive elements deter-
mined, if they can, to undermine any new system from the outset.
Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals, supra note 59, para. 52, at 13.
131. On Tuesday 14 May a body known as the Ulster Workers' Council, which had
no trade union or party standing, but had been brought into being by the para-
military organizations, placed an advertisement in the press that they would call a
general stoppage of work in the Province if the Northern Ireland Assembly voted
on that day to support the Sunningdale Agreement. The Assembly did so vote to
support the Agreement and the constitutional settlement laid down in Westmin-
ster's 1973 legislation.
The following day the Rev. Ian Paisley and Mr William Craig MP, together
with a Unionist member of the Northern Ireland Assembly, led a deputation to
Northern Ireland ministers of three members of the Ulster Workers' Council, and
three observers directly representing Protestant para-military organizations. Minis-
ters were told flatly that their object was to destroy the Sunningdale Agreement and
the Assembly pending new elections. They would enforce their demands by con-
trolling the supply of electricity, themselves determining who should have current
and who should be cut off.
On 16 May intimidation became virtually total. Workers seeking to go to the
shipyards, textile mills or engineering works were prevented by manned barricades.
H. WILSON, supra note 53, at 74.
132. F. LONGFORD & A. MCHARDY, supra note 121, at 172. In the first U.K. government
discussion paper on Northern Ireland post-May 1974, Northern Ireland Secretary Merlyn
Rees paid tribute to the fallen Executive:
In the political history of these islands few men had ever undertaken a more ardu-
ous yet honourable task, with the full awareness of the dangers to which they were
exposing themselves. What they attempted to do was undoubtedly distorted and
misrepresented and they found it more difficult to establish themselves and their
policies against a background of continuing violence . . . . Yet if the Executive
failed the men who served in it did not fail, they disproved forever the idea that it is
not possible for Protestants and Roman Catholics to work together for the good of
Northern Ireland and its people.
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In Usher's terms, the Protestant extraparliamentary veto was
not abused. It was not an instance of ransom bargaining by the
Protestant bloc. The Protestant extraparliamentary veto was used
solely to thwart a policy, the Council of Ireland, which the bloc
perceived as harmful. From these events, Professor Usher might
conclude that the lesson of 1974 Northern Ireland is not that the
ransom bargaining opportunity will always be abused. Rather,
real-world vetoes should be institutionalized through a concurrent
majority formula to inspire popular confidence in constitutional in-
stitutions and to preclude extraparliamentary vetoes from erupting
in the streets.
X. THE REVERSE LOGROLLING DIMENSION
It should be remembered that in his Disquisition outline of the
concurrent majority, Calhoun anticipated guaging, through its own
majority, the separate concern of each interest that would be un-
equally affected by the government and then requiring the consent
of each such interest to activate government. In shielding only
those interests unequally affected by a proposed government pro-
gram with a veto,' 33 Calhoun helped minimize the opportunity for
bad faith rule-or-ruin ransom bargaining.
Moreover, Usher's one-issue-and-one-vote hypothetical some-
what shortsightedly overlooks the long-term opportunity for what
one might characterize as "reverse logrolling," that is, the purchase
of unanimity on a present issue with the promise of unanimity on a
later one. Political logrolling exists when a minority can exact con-
cessions from other minorities in creating a majority. In so doing, it
creates a minority "veto."' 34 In reverse logrolling, a veto-bearing
bloc can similarly exact concessions from other veto-bearing blocs
seeking unanimity. Usher's recalcitrant vetoer might derive short-
term net profit from holding the community to ransom on a given
issue, but he might still be deterred from using his veto by the
threat of the recalcitrant's own programs subsequently being
vetoed.
As previously stated, Usher has identified an arguable flaw in-
Id. at 162.
133. See supra text accompanying note 76. When Calhoun zeroed in on these majority/
minority differences of interest, he was "strikingly similar" to Alexis de Tocqueville. F.
HERMENS, THE REPRESENTATIVE REPUBLIC 527 n. 8 (1958), citing A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DE-
MOCRACY IN AMERICA 269 (1955).
134. R. CURRENT, supra note 68, at 144.
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herent in the concurrent majority principle. The more parties that
wield the veto, the more politically onerous reverse logrolling be-
comes. 35 In turn, the concurrent majority principle becomes less
practicable. 36  However, Calhoun, quite consistent with these
Usher-inspired observations, declared that the veto was to be borne
only by the established classes. Usually, these would be few
enough to facilitate reverse logrolling. In Northern Ireland, these
established classes conveniently number only two.
XI. CONCLUSION
In 1982 a new attempt at constitution-making was undertaken
in war-torn Northern Ireland. This latest attempt was but one in a
long line of plans for equitable power sharing. The 1982 proposal,
founded on a White Paper by James Prior, Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland, called for a seventy-eight-member unicameral
assembly. The aim of this Northern Ireland Assembly was to offer
proposals to the British government for the devolution of political
power.
The Assembly plan, however, was not well received. Tradi-
tional Protestant and Catholic cleavages were manifested in vio-
lence preceding the Assembly election and threats of boycott
135. The claim that legislative negotiation to create twin concurring majorities is onerous
cannot alone defeat the concurrent majority principle. The protest proves too much since its
essence relates, in some degree, to any form of constitutionalism:
In one respect, and only one, the government of the numerical majority has the
advantage over that of the concurrent if, indeed, it can be called an advantage. I
refer to its simplicity and facility of construction. It is simple indeed, wielded, as it
is, by a single power--the will of the greater number--and very easy of construc-
tion. For this purpose nothing more is necessary than universal suffrage and the
regulation of the manner of voting so as to give to the greater number the supreme
control over every department of government.
But whatever advantages simplicity and facility of construction may give it, the
other forms of absolute government possess them in a still higher degree. The con-
struction of the government of the numerical majority, simple as it is, requires some
preliminary measures and arrangements, while the others, especially the
monarchical, will, in its absence or where it proves incompetent, force themselves
on the community. And hence, among other reasons, the tendency of all govern-
ments is from the more complex and difficult of construction to the more simple
and easily constructed, and, finally, to absolute monarchy as the most simple of all.
Complexity and difficulty of construction, as far as they form objections, apply not
only to governments of the concurrent majority of the popular form but to constitu-
tional governments of every form.
J. CALHOUN, supra note 67, at 59.
136. A Calhounian minority veto institutionalizes the Pareto Optimality criterion for so-
cial decision making. This criterion requires that at least one member of the community be
rendered better off while none is rendered worse off. D. WHYNES & R. BOWLES, THE Eco-
NOMIC THEORY OF THE STATE 43-46, 54-55 (1981).
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following it. The election results also demonstrated continued po-
larization rather than hoped-for reconciliation.
The lesson of the 1982 events seems to be that a viable power-
sharing scheme for Northern Ireland must adequately consider di-
vergent factional interests. Thus, to the extent that London plans to
remain in Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom should support
an assembly grounded in the concurrent majority theory of popular
government. Under a concurrent majority system, government is
derived from the entire populace by affording all factions either a
concurrent voice in making laws or a veto on their execution. This
contrasts with constitutional theories which derive government
from one faction or another in a polarized community.
Although the concurrent majority principle promises political
partnerships, it is not without inherent problems. An economic
analysis of voting behavior suggests that when unanimity is re-
quired, a faction may withhold its concurrent approval while nego-
tiating for some additional benefit or tribute. Such "ransom
bargaining" could theoretically deadlock a concurrent majority sys-
tem. However, analyses of the concurrent majority practice of the
U.N. Security Council and of the 1974 Northern Ireland Assembly
experiment suggest that in real-world applications, ransom bargain-
ing is not frequently abused.
It has also been suggested that, viewed over the long term, a
faction might actually attempt to purchase unanimity on a present
issue with the promise of unanimity on a later one. This so-called
reverse logrolling, in contrast to ransom bargaining, would facili-
tate concurrent majority practice. This would be particularly true
as the number of factions decreases. In Northern Ireland there are
but two distinct factions-a factor which further supports the adop-
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